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LITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE – OF 
POLITICS AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
JUSTICIABILITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
Inura Fernando* 
This article seeks to highlight the differences in the jurisprudence on the justiciability of climate 
change in Canada and the United States. Underpinning this article are questions about the 
appropriate role of the judiciary in addressing polycentric policy issues. This article will first outline 
the policy context in which legal issues of climate change are framed. Second, this article will explore 
the general doctrines of justiciability in Canada and the United States, and how these interrelate with 
specific doctrines on the justiciability of climate change. The author argues that, with respect to the 
justiciability of climate change, the approach of the courts in the United States is more principled 
than that of the Canadian courts, the Canadian approach being more broadly framed. This is because 
the United States approach encompasses the classic strand of the political questions doctrine. 
Conversely, though the courts in Canada deny the existence of an American-style political questions 
doctrine, they unwittingly follow its prudential strand. This has negative implications for legal 
reasoning. This means that despite contrary appearances from the United States executive, the courts 
in the United States provide a stronger framework for the protection of the climate.  
Must our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that we render ourselves helpless when 
the existing methods and the traditional concepts do not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate 
for new issues?1 
  
*  BHSc, LLB, LLM (Second Class, First Division Hons), University of Auckland. I would like to acknowledge 
the unerring love and support of my parents, Mala and Lal Fernando. I want to especially thank Professor Liz 
Fisher for her kind support and guidance. 
1  Sierra Club v Morton 405 US 727 (1972) at 755–756 per Blackmun J dissenting.  
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I  INTRODUCTION 
The ice caps are melting. The globe is warming. The weather is becoming erratic. Climate change 
is happening. Climate change is a challenge facing all humanity. It is a collective problem. However, 
domestic western legal systems are based on individual rights and freedoms. This has an impact on 
what the courts will deem justiciable and adjudicate on. Should courts stick to traditional legal 
doctrines that limit the rights of individual litigants? A related question is whether climate change 
cases should be deemed to automatically involve non-justiciable political questions that should be 
dealt with by other branches of government such as Parliament or the executive.  
Judicial reasoning is an inherently strange beast. Also, the complex multifaceted nature of climate 
change and the complexity of climate change cases inevitably will lead to challenges for domestic and 
international legal systems. There are also the traditional conceptions of justiciability and their 
interrelationship with climate change that is relevant here, namely that justiciability is strict in the 
United States and more relaxed in Canada.2  In analysing the judicial reasoning relating to the 
justiciability of climate change, it is imperative to ask whether the judiciary is "environmentally 
myopic" as Sir Harry Woolf states,3 or whether the judiciary is actively seeking to fill the "governance 
gap" left behind following poor responses to climate change on the part of the other branches of 
government.4 This approach gets to the truth of the notion that "the vital purpose of justiciability is to 
give courts a mechanism by which to avoid awkward cases".5 In canvassing these questions, this 
article will seek to illuminate the role of judges in legal jurisprudence. 
The central thesis of this article is that, while judges in both the United States and Canada are 
influenced by general formulations of justiciability in shaping their position on the justiciability of 
climate change, the judges in the United States take a "more principled" route while the judicial 
approach in Canada is more broadly framed.6 This is because judges in America use their established 
political questions doctrine as a marker,7 even though some scholars do question its existence,8 which 
  
2  Hugh S Wilkins "The Justiciability of Climate Change: A Comparison of US and Canadian Approaches" 
(2011) 34 Dalhousie LJ 529 at 529. 
3  Harry Woolf "Are the Judiciary Environmentally Myopic?" (1992) 4 JEL 1 at 1.  
4  Lisa Vanhala and Chris Hilson "Climate Change Litigation: Symposium Introduction" (2013) 35 Law & 
Policy 141 at 143. 
5  Jonathan R Siegel "A Theory of Justiciability" (2007) 86 Tex L Rev 73 at 108. See also Cass R Sunstein 
"Leaving Things Undecided" (1996) 110 Harv L Rev 4 at 51–52.  
6  Wilkins, above n 2, at 545. 
7  Ashley E Breakfield "Political Cases or Political Questions: The Justiciability of Public Nuisance Climate 
Change Litigation and the Impact on Native Village of Kivalina v Exxonmobil" (2011) 17 Hastings WNW J 
Envtl L & Poly 39 at 39–40.  
8  See Louis Henkin "Is there a 'Political Question' Doctrine?" (1976) Yale LJ 597 at 600–601.  
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lays the path for greater clarity and consistency in legal reasoning. The legal test for justiciability laid 
out in Baker v Carr is a moot example.9 This has a flow-on effect on the conceptualisation of the 
justiciability of climate change.10 In this process, American judges, particularly in courts below the 
Supreme Court,11  favour the classic strand as opposed to the prudential strand of the political 
questions doctrine.12 It is argued that the focus on the classic strand strikes the right balance between 
certainty and judicial discretion. Otherwise "the boundary between political and legal questions" will 
remain blurred and it will continue to form a challenge for those on both sides of the debate.13 Equally, 
courts also have a remedies focus which is highlighted in cases such as Comer v Murphy Oil USA and 
Connecticut v American Electric Power Co Inc (AEP),14 which allow for principled distinctions to be 
made between cases that will have radically different impacts on public policy and the wider 
considerations underpinning justiciability. Conversely, judges in Canada, despite having denied the 
existence of an American-style political question doctrine, 15  have nonetheless formulated 
justiciability in a manner that mirrors the prudential strand of the United States political questions 
doctrine in cases related to the justiciability of climate change such as Friends of the Earth v Canada 
(Governor in Council) and Turp v Canada (Minister of Justice).16 Furthermore, Canadian courts in 
these cases,17 in their preference towards centralising statutory interpretation encouraged by United 
Kingdom case law, create a more broadly framed justiciability of climate change analysis than that 
afforded by the trend in the United States.  
  
9  Baker v Carr 369 US 186 (1962) at 217.  
10  See David Markell and JB Ruhl "An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New 
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?" (2012) 64 Fla L Rev 15 at 77. 
11  For a discussion of a lack of any clear judicial pronouncement on the justiciability of climate change at the 
Supreme Court level, see Hari M Osofsky "Litigation's Role in the Path of the US Federal Climate Change 
Regulation: Implications of AEP v Connecticut" (2012) 46 Val U L Rev 447 at 452–453.  
12  Breakfield, above n 7, at 43.  
13  Lorne M Sossin Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada (Carswell, Scarborough, 
1999) at 133. 
14  Comer v Murphy Oil USA 585 F 3d 855 (5th Cir 2009) at 874; and Connecticut v American Electric Power 
Co Inc 582 F 3d 309 (2nd Cir 2009) [AEP] at 325.  
15  Lorne Sossin "The Unfinished Project of Roncarelli v Duplessis: Justiciability. Discretion, and the Limits of 
the Rule of Law" (2010) 55 Mcgill LJ 661 at 681. See also Operation Dismantle v The Queen [1985] 1 SCR 
441 at 464–474 per Wilson J.  
16  Friends of the Earth v Canada (Governor in Council) 2008 FC 1183, [2009] 3 FCR 201 at [24]–[42]; and 
Turp v Canada (Minister of Justice) 2012 FC 893, [2014] 1 FCR 439 at [18]–[28]. 
17  Friends of the Earth, above n 16, at [26] and [33]. See also Turp, above n 16, at [25].  
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Admittedly, there are some limitations to this analysis.18 First, the United States has yet to 
implement a comprehensive legislative scheme on climate change at a federal level.19 Secondly, 
Canada has yet to face the type of tort-based, climate change-related nuisance claims that have heavily 
impacted the United States justiciability of climate change.20 However, because this article analyses 
the current position, while acknowledging that the law in this area is in a "constant state of flux" and 
affected by a complex web of factors,21 the current position is underpinned by patterns of judicial 
reasoning that support the position taken by this article.  
This article is organised as follows. Part II will explore the context surrounding justiciability of 
climate change. Part III will explore how justiciability is defined in the United States and Canada. 
Part IV will explore how judges determine the justiciability of climate change in America and Canada 
respectively. Ultimately this article will conclude that overall the current prevailing judicial trend 
points to a principled approach in the United States compared to a broad-brush approach in Canada. 
This will, in turn, have important consequences for the development of legal jurisprudence and 
practical consequences for stakeholders involved. 
II  CONTEXT 
Jurisprudence on the justiciability of climate change exists in an unusual context. This context 
relates to the nature of climate change as a new legal discipline and the politics of climate change. It 
is imperative to understand that climate change law is a newly formed subset of the legal discipline 
and it is still growing. Further, the politics of climate change is vexed and encompasses what is termed 
the "polycentricity" of climate change.22 According to Professor Jacqueline Peel, climate change law 
"encompasses aspects of the existing environmental and broader legal framework, employing them in 
new ways to respond to aspects of the climate change problem".23 Equally, the polycentricity of 
climate change entails that "there are many different causes of climate change and those causes are 
complex in themselves".24 Professor Lon Fuller utilises the "spider web" metaphor to characterise this 
  
18  For a discussion of some of the inherent challenges of environmental law scholarship that is also relevant in 
this context, see Elizabeth Fisher and others "Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about 
Environmental Law Scholarship" (2009) 21 JEL 213 at 225–226. 
19  Hari M Osofsky and Lesley K McAllister Climate Change Law and Policy (Wolters Kluwer, New York, 
2012) at 118.  
20  Wilkins, above n 2, at 538.  
21  Elizabeth Fisher "Environmental Law as 'Hot' Law" (2013) 25 JEL 347 at 347.  
22  Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange and Eloise Scotford Environmental Laws: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 24. 
23  Jacqueline Peel "Climate Change Law: The Emergence of a New Legal Discipline" (2008) 32 MULR 922 at 
927. 
24  Fisher, Lange and Scotford, above n 22, at 24. 
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state of affairs.25 Some of the key challenges of this new climate change law discipline centre on the 
marriage between science and law. The scholarship of Sara Aminzadeh highlights the intricacies of 
establishing damage to the environment brought on by climate change in scientific terms.26 These 
intricacies mean that there are difficulties in achieving legal redress for claims based on climate 
science.27 Equally, Professor Hari M Osofsky notes: "Climate change petitions do not fit neatly into 
this mainstream discussion of judicial dialogue."28 There is a melding between the national and 
international law that is added to the mix.29 
Some may argue that, though climate change is new, the law has had many challenges along the 
way that shook its core. So why then should time honoured legal principles be changed for this so-
called new discipline? There has always been a contest of rights in most legal issues, and climate 
change is no different. There are those who will be the losers from climate change, while there will 
be those who will benefit.30 However, climate change law cuts across many fields and there are no 
binary solutions that would justify recourse to some generalist argument about a contest of rights. As 
Professor Liz Fisher notes: "Decision making about the environment is not an exercise that individuals 
can take in isolation."31 It is an issue of more than two groups of winners and losers. There are 
spectrums of winners and losers, and others that will fall beyond a strict prisoner's dilemma scenario.32 
Therefore, developing a climate change jurisprudence that is appropriate and allows for a 
collaborative response to climate change will be crucial. The judiciary will play a significant part in 
this response.33  
An interesting perspective on climate change is put forward by indigenous peoples, whose culture 
and way of life is intimately tied to the environment.34 Also as Sara Aminzadeh notes: "Indigenous 
  
25  Lon L Fuller "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harv L Rev 353 at 395. 
26  Sara C Aminzadeh "A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of Climate Change" (2007) 30 
Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 231 at 233. 
27  At 233. 
28  Hari M Osofsky "Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?" (2007) 43A Stan J Intl L 181 at 
192. 
29  At 192. 
30  See generally John S Dryzek, Richard B Norgaard and David Schlosberg Climate-Challenged Society (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013). See also JB Ruhl "The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners" 
(2012) 97 Minn L Rev 206 at 207–240. 
31  Fisher, Lange and Scotford, above n 22, at 24.  
32  See generally Richard H McAdams "Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law" 
(2009) 82 S Cal L Rev 209 at 225–236.  
33  See Brian J Preston "The Contribution of the Courts in Tackling Climate Change" (2016) 28 JEL 11 at 11. 
34  Aminzadeh, above n 26, at 254–255.  
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peoples often inhabit some of the world's most vulnerable ecosystems and suffer some of the worst 
effects of environmental degradation".35 Despite being disproportionately affected by climate change, 
indigenous peoples are often left marginalised by the judicial dialogue as seen in case law relating to 
the Arctic Inuit and climate change.36 
Environmental law is tritely described as "hot" law.37 However, if environmental law is "hot" law, 
then climate change law must be "super hot" law. It is important to understand the context in which 
legal reasoning relating to climate change operates. It is not a binary world in the least. It is one of 
shifting causes and shifting truths. It is one of the multiple stakeholders on many different levels. It is 
one of multiple perspectives. It is one that is apt for scholarly dialogue.  
III  HOW IS JUSTICIABILITY DEFINED? 
Before venturing into discussions on the justiciability of climate change, it is first imperative to 
explore how justiciability in a general sense is defined in both the United States and Canada. There 
are nuances in the legal pronouncement on justiciability between the United States and Canada. The 
nuance is that the Canadian legal definition is "fragmented"38 and broadly framed whereas the United 
States definition is more tightly framed,39 as per the test in Baker.40 The United States approach also 
encompasses a specific doctrine known as the political questions doctrine, which has two central 
strands, the classic and prudential strands.41 The classic strand is based on the "text, structure, and 
history of the constitution itself",42 whereas the prudential strand "does not involve constitutional 
interpretation but rather a judge-made overlay used to avoid conflicts with other branches and to avoid 
embarrassment".43 This nuance, however, is not immediately obvious from a cursory glance of the 
respective legal dictionary definitions of justiciability. The Black's Law Dictionary defines 
justiciability as "the quality, state or condition of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication by a 
  
35  At 255. 
36  See generally Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada "Inuit Petition Inter-American Commission On Human 
Rights To Oppose Climate Change Caused By The United States Of America" (press release, 7 December 
2005).  
37  Fisher, above n 21, at 347. 
38  Wilkins, above n 2, at 543. 
39  At 543–545. 
40  Baker, above n 9, at 217. 
41  Rachel E Barkow "More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of 
Judicial Supremacy" (2002) 102 Colum L Rev 237 at 253. 
42  At 253.  
43  At 253.  
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court".44 Equally, The Dictionary of Canadian Law puts forward a similar definition, although as a 
point of mild difference, it incorporates the notion of "judicial restraint" into the definition.45 
In order to outline the fragmentation in the Canadian legal definition of justiciability, it is 
necessary to understand the different strands of case law.46 One strand encourages a more relaxed 
approach to justiciability while the other strand is stricter and broadly framed. The cases heralding the 
relaxed approach are Operation Dismantle v The Queen and Finlay v Canada (Minister of Finance).47 
The approach in Operation Dismantle was very much affected by the fact that it was a challenge under 
s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.48 Nevertheless, Wilson J emphasised that "courts 
should not be too eager to relinquish their judicial review function simply because they are called 
upon to exercise it in relation to weighty matters of states".49 Equally, in agreeing with Wilson J's 
approach, Dickson CJ finds "no doubt that disputes of a political or foreign policy nature may be 
properly cognizable by the courts".50 
Equally, the Court in Finlay cites the Operation Dismantle approach in relation to the justiciability 
issue and notes that:51 
That was, of course, said in the context of the judicial duty to rule on an issue of constitutionality under 
the Charter, but take it to be equally applicable to a non-constitutional issue of the limits of statutory 
authority.  
Conversely, the strict approach is heralded by cases such as Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan 
(BC) and Canada (Auditor General) v Canada (Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources).52 In 
Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC), the Court affirmed the approach of Auditor General and 
Borowski v Canada (Attorney General),53 and concluded that "the Court's primary concern is to retain 
  
44  Bryan A Garner (ed) Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed, Thomson Reuters, St Paul, 2014) at 997. 
45  Daphne A Dukelow The Dictionary of Canadian Law (4th ed, Carswell, Toronto, 2011) at 698.  
46  Wilkins, above n 2, at 543–544. 
47  Operation Dismantle, above n 15; and Finlay v Canada (Minister of Finance) [1986] 2 SCR 607. 
48  Operation Dismantle, above n 15, at 447. See also Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, pt 1 of the 
Constitution Act 1982, being sch B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK). 
49  At 471 per Wilson J. 
50  At 459 per Dickson CJ. 
51  Finlay, above n 47, at 632 per Le Dain J (emphasis added). 
52  Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC) [1991] 2 SCR 525; and Canada (Auditor General) v Canada 
(Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources) [1989] 2 SCR 49 [Auditor General]. 
53  See Auditor General, above n 52, at 90–91; and Borowski v Canada (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 342 at 
362. 
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its proper role within the constitutional framework of our democratic form of government". 54  In 
determining the legal issue posed, Sopinka J utilised a two-pronged test. First, the court has to ascertain, 
"whether the question is purely political in nature and should, therefore, be determined in another 
forum".55 Secondly, the court has to determine whether the matter has a "sufficient legal component to 
warrant the intervention of the judicial branch".56 
Fragmentation occurs between the strands because each strand has different starting points. The 
relaxed strand "starts from the position that, with some exceptions, most policy related matters should 
be justiciable",57 whereas the strict strand of justiciability "starts from the position that most policy-
related matters should be left to the legislature".58 
In understanding the American definition of justiciability, legal history provides a useful starting 
point. The American political questions doctrine had its root in the seminal case, Marbury v 
Madison.59 Although the legal principle comes from this case, it was said to be not applicable to the 
facts of this case.60 Justice Marshall framed political questions as: "Questions, in their nature political, 
or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, [and] can [thus] never be made 
in this court".61 Equally, Marshall J noted that:62 
… where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to 
execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional 
or legal discretion … their acts are only politically examinable.  
However, Marshall J "went on to rule for the Court that the government's legal duty to furnish 
Marbury's promised commission to serve as a justice of peace was not such a situation".63 As 
Professor Phillip Weinberg notes:64 
  
54  Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC), above n 52, at 545 per Sopinka J. 
55  At 545 per Sopinka J. 
56  At 545 per Sopinka J. 
57  Wilkins, above n 2, at 544. 
58  At 544–545. 
59  Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803). 
60  Phillip Weinberg "'Political Questions': An Invasive Species Infecting the Courts" (2008) 19 Duke Envtl L & 
Poly F 155 at 156. 
61  Marbury, above n 59, at 170. 
62  At 166. 
63  Weinberg, above n 60, at 156.  
64  At 156. 
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This decision, establishing the power of judicial review, of course veered off to hold the provision of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 empowering the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in its original 
jurisdiction cases to be unconstitutional.  
Nevertheless, Marshall J's judgment in Marbury has come to epitomise the classical strand of the 
political questions doctrine. 65  Justice Marshall's approach was very much influenced by his 
contemporaries, namely Alexander Hamilton and his writings in The Federalist Papers about 
separation of powers, judicial review and the judiciary's place in the constitutional apex.66 However, 
the approach in Marbury was not the end of the matter and some argue that it created an "interpretive 
vacuum".67 Along with the Great Depression, changes had come to America and its socio-political 
landscape in the New Deal era of the 1930s.68 The political question doctrine changed during this 
period from one that centralised constitutional interpretation to one that centralised prudential 
concerns and judicial restraint.69 The prudential approach involved "courts looking not to the text of 
the Constitution itself, but rather to the consequences of the case in contemplating whether a political 
question exists".70 Some scholars have expressed caution over the prudential approach, namely the 
risk that courts will seek to forgo cases which are "too complicated or too politically charged".71 
The motif of change continued and Baker v Carr represented a watershed that provided political 
questions doctrine the "detailed structure" it needed.72 The Court in Baker laid out the six key 
elements of the classical formulation of justiciability in the United States.73 In order to be deemed a 
political question, a case needed to have at least one of the following six elements. First, there needs 
to be a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
  
65  Barkow, above n 41, at 253. See also Robert J Pushaw "Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: 
Reviving the Federalist Rebuttable Presumption' Analysis" (2002) 80 NC L Rev 1165 at 1192–1193.  
66  Jill Jaffe "The Political Question Doctrine: An Update in Response to Recent Case Law" (2011) 38 Ecology 
LQ 1033 at 1037. See also Alexander Hamilton The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of 
the New Constitution, as Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787 (J & A McLean, New 
York, 1788). 
67  Breakfield, above n 7, at 43.  
68  See generally GE White The Constitution and the New Deal (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 
2002). 
69  Gregory Bradford "Simplyfing State Standing: The Role of Sovereign Interests in Future Climate Litigation" 
(2011) 52 BC L Rev 1065 at 1080. 
70  Breakfield, above n 7, at 43. 
71  Barkow, above n 41, at 263. 
72  Breakfield, above n 7, at 43.  
73  Baker, above n 9, at 217. 
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department".74 Secondly, the "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it".75 Thirdly, whether there is the "impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination 
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion".76 Fourthly, whether there is "the impossibility of a 
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due to coordinate 
branches of government".77 Fifthly, whether there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made".78 Finally, whether there is "the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question".79  
The Baker test represents an amalgam of the classic and prudential approaches. The first two parts 
of the test, relating to constitutional commitment and judicial standards, represents the classic 
approach,80 while the latter four parts of the Baker test reflects prudential concerns.81 Even though 
the Baker test is not necessarily an exhaustive articulation of justiciability, it does entail "a narrowed 
scope" of the political questions doctrine.82 
In sum, the fragmented Canadian approach means that while justiciability in Canada is more akin 
to a "broader spectrum of judicial oversight",83  the American approach is closer to "an on/off 
switch".84 The nature of judicial reasoning is so fraught that a notion of an "on/off switch" is not a 
practical ideal. The best that can be hoped for is a greater degree of clarity and enumeration, which is 
not necessarily the same as bright-line distinctions.85  
  
74  At 217. 
75  At 217. 
76  At 217. 
77  At 217. 
78  At 217. 
79  At 217. 
80  Breakfied, above n 7, at 44. 
81  At 44.  
82  At 44.  
83  Sossin, above n 15, at 666.  
84  At 666. 
85  See generally James G Wilson "Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line–Balancing Test 
Continuum" (1995) 27 Ariz St LJ 773 at 773–807.  
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IV  FACTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF KEY CASES ON 
JUSTICIABILITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 
In terms of the United States case law on the justiciability of climate change, it is important to 
understand the factual underpinnings of cases such as AEP and Comer v Murphy.86 In AEP, the 
Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals was presented with a situation symptomatic of 
effects of climate change on society. The plaintiffs in this case included the States of New York, 
California, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, the City of New York and three 
land trusts.87 In 2004 these plaintiffs sought the remedy of abatement against American Electric 
Power Inc and five other electricity companies, for the "ongoing contributions to the public nuisance 
of global warming".88 In 2005 the United States District Court held that these claims inevitably 
involved "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion".89 Therefore it 
ruled that the claims were barred under the political questions doctrine. On appeal to the Court of 
Appeals, the plaintiffs contended that these claims have standing and are justiciable.90 Equally, they 
argued that they have appropriately fashioned their claims by recourse to the law of nuisance and that 
"these claims are not displaced by federal statutes".91 On the other hand, the defendants sought to 
reaffirm the District Court position, that these claims were non-justiciable, lacked standing, failed to 
state a claim and that federal common law had been displaced by federal statutes.92 
In Comer v Murphy, the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals considered the claims 
of nuisance (both public and private), trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent 
misrepresentation and civil conspiracy against oil and energy companies operating in the Mississippi 
Gulf Coast.93 These claims were brought by land owners in the area who asserted that operations of 
these companies contributed to a cascade of events that culminated in hotter surface air and water, as 
well as an increase in sea levels.94 This is said to have increased the strength of Hurricane Katrina, 
which in turn damaged both buildings owned by the landowners and public facilities in the area.95 In 
  
86  AEP, above n 14; and Comer, above n 14. 
87  AEP, above n 14, at 314. 
88  At 314. 
89  Connecticut v American Electricity Power Co Inc 406 F Supp 2d 265 (SD NY 2005) at 274. 
90  AEP, above n 14, at 314. 
91  At 314. 
92  At 314–315.  
93  Comer, above n 14, at 859–860. 
94  At 859. 
95  At 859. 
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contrast, the defendants in Comer v Murphy sought to challenge these claims on the grounds of lack 
of standing and non-justiciability via the political questions doctrine.96 
The factual underpinnings of the Canadian case law, as seen in Friends of the Earth and Turp, are 
different to the United States case law. The main difference is that both Canadian cases revolve around 
the specific legislation passed to deal with climate change, namely the Kyoto Protocol Implementation 
Act 2007 (KPIA).97 In Friends of the Earth, the Federal Court was presented with its first opportunity 
to review the KPIA.98 The applicant in this case was a non-governmental organisation seeking to 
protect the natural environment.99 The applicant brought a judicial review action seeking declaratory 
and mandatory relief in relation to the KPIA.100 Namely, the applicant alleged breaches of s 5 of the 
KPIA due to the failure of the Environment Minister to prepare an initial Climate Change Plan.101 
Also, it alleges breaches of ss 7 and 8–9 of the KPIA on the part of the Governor in Council (GIC). 
This is because the GIC failed to carry out the requirements in relation to publishing and repeal of 
inconsistent provisions in relation to proposed regulations within the time deadlines prescribed in the 
KPIA, in order for Canada to meet its Kyoto Protocol obligations.102 The arguments of the applicant 
emphasise the language utilised in the KPIA.103 Conversely, the respondent contended that the claims 
presented by the applicant are non-justiciable because "they are not properly suited or amenable to 
judicial review".104 This thesis is supported by notions of deference to the policy choices made by 
Parliament. In other words, the respondent argues that "accountability for their failure to fulfil 
Canada's Kyoto obligations will be at the ballot box and cannot be in the courtroom".105 In Turp, the 
Federal Court considered a judicial review of the "decision of the Government of Canada to withdraw 
from the Kyoto Protocol … which was communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
… on December 15, 2011".106 The applicant in Turp stated that:107 
  
96  At 860. 
97  Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act SC 2007 c 30. 
98  See Friends of the Earth, above n 16, at [1]–[7]. 
99  At [1]. 
100  At [2]. 
101  At [3]. 
102  At [4]–[5]. 
103  At [6]. 
104  At [7]. 
105  At [7]. 
106  Turp, above n 16, at [1]. 
107  At [13]. 
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The withdrawal from the Protocol is illegal, null, and void as it is in violation of the KPIA, the principle 
of the rule of law, the principle of the separation of powers, and the democratic principle.  
The defendant in Turp, the Attorney-General of Canada, contended that:108  
… the conduct of foreign affairs, including the decision to conclude or withdraw from an international 
treaty, is a matter falling within the royal prerogative and thus the executive branch of government. 
V ANALYSIS 
A  How do Judges Determine the Justiciability of Climate Change in the 
United States? 
1 The Baker test and the flow-on effects of how justiciability is defined 
A key argument on the notion that the American judicial approach to the justiciability of climate 
change follows a principled route relates to the flow-on effects of the Baker test. This is not only an 
argument about the flow-on effects of the general jurisprudence on justiciability to specific 
jurisprudence on the justiciability of climate change; it is also an argument about the intricacies of the 
Baker test. Namely, the incorporation of both the classic strand and the prudential strand in the Baker 
test makes for greater legal certainty. Also, the legal test in Baker is genius in terms of separating 
discrete legal and constitutional imperatives so as to avoid confusion and inconsistency. 
The Supreme Court in Baker made a painstaking effort to emphasise that: "The doctrine which 
we treat is one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political cases'",109 whereas this concern is less 
emphasised in the prevailing Canadian approach. 110  Equally, the Court in AEP found that in 
considering the political implications of setting emission standards that "it is [an] error to equate a 
political question with a political case".111 The lack of a clear approach on the justiciability of climate 
change at the Supreme Court level in AEP112 means that the lower courts' approach stands as the 
prevailing approach. As David Markell and JB Ruhl note, there is no "distinctive jurisprudence of 
climate change" that can be separated from the general justiciability jurisprudence.113 This is turn 
heightens the importance of the Baker test. 
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109  Baker, above n 9, at 217. 
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113  Markell and Ruhl, above n 10, at 77. 
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As the Second Circuit noted in AEP:114 
Baker set a high bar for non-justiciability: Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case 
bar there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question presence.  
Some would argue that greater theorisation in a legal test does not necessarily lead to a principled 
approach and it can even lead to a rigid approach to a multifaceted legal question.115 However, as 
noted in Comer v Murphy the Baker formulation was not meant to be a legal straightjacket, but rather 
"open textured, interpretive guides to aid federal courts"116 and that "the Baker formulations are not 
self sufficient definitions".117 The "open textured" approach to Baker has allowed the courts to make 
principled distinctions, while still utilising the framework laid out by Baker.118 In AEP, the second 
circuit found the defendants lacking in failing to "explain how the emissions issues is textually 
committed to the Commerce clause [of the United States Constitution]".119 Equally, the Second 
Circuit in AEP disagreed with the defendants that "there are no judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for settling this case"120 and that "[w]ell settled principles of tort and public 
nuisance law provide appropriate guidance."121 
A key flow-on effect of the Baker test is greater theorisation in the judicial approach on 
justiciability of climate change in America. This enumeration lays the path for principled reasoning 
and in turn, leaves the American courts less likely to be scouring to maintain an "incomplete" 
theorisation.122 This is not the same as full theorisation and the raison d'être of the case representing 
the prevailing approach has flexibility in it, while not becoming out of touch with the established 
framework.  
2 The use of the classic strand of the political questions doctrine 
The use of the classic strand of the political questions doctrine in the cases about justiciability of 
climate change is one of the key arguments suggesting that the American approach is a more 
principled one. This is particularly seen in the prevailing approach in courts below the Supreme Court, 
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in cases such as Comer v Murphy and AEP. The classical strand, which encompasses the first part of 
the Baker test, asks is "there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department?"123 The Federal Court of Appeals in AEP affirmed the approach of 
Lamont v Woods in holding that this first factor is the "dominant consideration in any political question 
inquiry".124 The reason why it is a more principled approach is that in the words of Professor Lorne 
Sossin it acts more akin to an "on/off switch" than a "spectrum" in framing justiciability,125 thus 
reducing judicial discretion and setting a kind of objective yardstick. This approach, however, does 
not completely alienate the prudential strand, but it affords the classic strand more importance. Judge 
Dennis in Comer v Murphy at the Fifth Circuit outlines this approach to justiciability which centralises 
the classic strand. According to Judge Dennis justiciability is a function of whether a question is 
"constitutionally capable of being judicially decided".126 Judge Dennis's formulation incorporates the 
doctrine of separation of powers, American constitutional doctrine, relevant legislative frameworks 
and constitutional conventions relating to Congress and the United States President.127 Judge Dennis 
also clarifies what the question of constitutional capability excludes, namely, "federal judges' 
capability, intellect, knowledge, expertise or training, … the inherent difficulty, complexity, novelty 
or esotery of the matter to be resolved".128 The shift from the focus on the complexity of the matter 
is a significant change. 
It is argued that Judge Dennis's framing of justiciability demonstrates a clear emphasis on 
constitutional interpretation that is consistent with the classic strand and, unlike the Canadian 
approach, broader prudential concerns are not centralised. Even if later Judge Dennis goes on to 
consider prudential concerns vis-à-vis the latter parts of the Baker test, in this early framing of 
justiciability, Judge Dennis explicitly rejects certain concerns that could be broadly lumped into 
prudential concern in a broad calculus such as "federal judges' capability, intellect, knowledge, 
expertise or training, nor upon the inherent difficulty, complexity, novelty or esotery of the matter to 
be resolved".129 In Comer v Murphy, this focus on constitutional interpretation meant that there was 
in effect a different starting point to the justiciability analysis. There was a presumption-like effect in 
favour of justiciability where there were no other countervailing constitutional imperatives. Justice 
  
123  AEP, above n 14, at 324. 
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Dennis's justiciability analysis was not clouded by a generalised approach to what is deemed to be 
political. This is seen when Judge Dennis states that:130 
… in this context, "political" does not broadly relate to government, government policy, partisan or party 
politics, or the political system. A case or question that is "political" only in the broad sense, ie, that it has 
political implications or ramifications, is capable of being decided constitutionally by a federal court, so 
long as the question has not been committed by constitutional means exclusively to the elected or political 
branches. 
The nuance that a case can only be political in the "broad sense" is a significant one.131 The 
practical effect of this approach was that the Court held that the plaintiffs' tortious claims under 
nuisance, trespass and negligence were justiciable.132 
The focus of the classic strand is tied to the constitution and therefore it has recourse to 
constitutional case law as markers of reasoned judicial approach.133 Whereas the prudential inquiry 
is a broader one, related to a broader conception of judicial restraint. 134  It is unlikely that a 
prudentially focused, broadly framed inquiry could lead to principled distinctions, in the same way 
that an approach based on constitutional interpretation could. 
3  Remedies focus 
It is argued that the United States judicial approach to the justiciability of climate change is more 
principled due to its focus on remedies. This is because it allows for cases to be distinguished on the 
facts in terms of the remedies sought. This is seen in cases such as AEP and Comer v Murphy. This 
approach is more discerning and less broad-brushed than the Canadian approach, which does not make 
distinctions in terms of remedies. In AEP the Second Circuit emphasised that the claimants were not 
seeking to "ask the courts to fashion a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to global climate 
change".135 This was a task noted to fall outside the role of the courts and is one shared by the 
legislature and the executive.136 The claimants in AEP are seeking a more nuanced remedy, namely 
to:137  
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… limit emissions from six domestic coal-fired electricity plants on the ground that such emissions 
constitute a public nuisance that they alleged caused, is causing, and will continue to cause them injury. 
The strengths of the approach in AEP is that it does not get lost in the complexity but faces the 
issues and its nuances head on. The Court in effect heads to Blackmun J's verbatim in Sierra Club v 
Morton that:138 
Must our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that we render ourselves helpless when 
the existing methods and the traditional concepts do not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate 
for new issues? 
Such an approach does not render the court helpless and it keeps room for the court to not act. 
Equally, in Comer v Murphy the Court noted: "Claims for damages are also considerably less likely 
to present nonjusticiable political questions compared with injunctive relief."139 Also, Fifth Circuit 
precedent in cases such as Gordon v Texas emphasises that claims for damages are not considered "a 
form of relief that is not judicially manageable".140 Consequently, there is symmetry between the 
earlier arguments about the principled approach that flows from the Baker test and the principled 
distinctions that can be made via a remedies focus. Some argue whether the remedy sought matters in 
terms of the wider discussions of justiciability and whether it is an arbitrary distinction. It is argued 
that it does matter because the remedies sought impact on the policy implications of a judicial 
decision. There is a level of pragmatism and balance involved in the remedies focus which lends itself 
to be more principled in the wider contest rights among competing groups. 
The remedies focus encompasses evaluating the full impact of the relief sought by climate change 
plaintiffs. It strikes the optimum balance in the contest of rights inherent in climate change litigation. 
This approach builds on the principled nature of the Baker test and adds an important gloss to it.  
B  How do Judges Determine the Justiciability of Climate Change in 
Canada? 
1  Broadly framed approach and the flow-on effects of how justiciability is 
defined 
It is argued that the broadly framed approach to justiciability in Canada has negative 
consequences. It has a flow on effect in terms of the judicial determination of the justiciability of 
climate change. This flow-on effect is seen in Friends of the Earth where the Court affirmed the 
importance of an open-ended approach.141 This broadly framed approach, despite being perceived as 
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flexible by some, can become a guise for courts that want to avoid politically sensitive cases. It skews 
judicial reasoning. This is particularly in terms of the strict strand of Canadian justiciability and the 
associated fragmentation discussed earlier. Cases such as Re Canada Assistance Plan set up a legal 
test that is broadly framed.142 This is utilised by seminal Canadian cases on justiciability, such as 
Reference Re Succession of Quebec, to fashion a legal test for justiciability that is centred on the 
"courts own assessment of its proper role".143 This test is very broad compared to the six different 
components of the Baker test, which can also be divided into classic and prudential strands. The 
Canadian test, on the other hand, does not have different discrete components to it; instead the 
different components are subsumed together. Also there is a clear impact of the Baker test on the 
prevailing American case law on the justiciability of climate change, whereas Canadian case law has 
a fragmented effect. In Friends of the Earth the Court very much revelled in its own broadly framed 
approach.144 On the one hand, the Court acknowledges the usefulness of creating "criteria for a 
determination of justiciability, including factors such as institutional capacity and institutional 
legitimacy".145 It also found that determination of justiciability will involve a "diverse and shifting 
set of issues".146  Nonetheless, the Court reasoned that "it is necessary to leave the content of 
justiciability open-ended"147 and that "[w]e cannot state all the reasons why a matter may be non-
justiciable."148 There is an inconsistency in the reasoning. The Court contends that "there will always 
be, and always should be, a boundary between what courts should and should not decide".149 Yet, the 
Court is resolute that "this boundary should correspond to predictable and coherent principles".150 It 
is argued that the judges in Friends of the Earth were not able to fully reconcile the contradictions in 
the reasoning.  
The "open-textured"151 approach in Comer v Murphy is not the same as the "open-ended"152 
approach in Friends of the Earth. In referencing secondary sources to support its argument about 
justiciability, the Court went on to centralise broad notions of institutional legitimacy without 
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reference to any other counterbalancing factors.153 It is argued that the Court in Auditor General 
foreshadowed this broadly framed approach when it stated: "An inquiry into justiciability is, first and 
foremost, a normative inquiry".154 This is in contrast to a constitutional interpretation approach as in 
the classic strand in the United States. Also these normative inquiries by their very nature are 
subjective and "broad brushed".  
The approach in Friends of the Earth has negative consequences. The lack of clear theorisation 
on justiciability and an instead broadly framed approach means that there is greater chance of errors 
in judicial reasoning. In Friends of the Earth what the broad test effectively meant was that "Justice 
Barnes conflated the distinct concepts of enforceability and justiciability".155 This is with regard to 
Barnes J's discussion of provisions of KPIA that require an "equitable distribution" of greenhouse gas 
emissions across the different sectors of the economy, which were held to be "policy-laden 
considerations which are not the proper subject matter for judicial review".156 Therefore there were 
"no objective legal criteria which can be applied and no facts to be determined which could allow a 
court to decide whether compliance had been achieved".157 However, the glaring error in judicial 
reasoning is that the claimants in the case are not seeking an "equitable distribution of GHG 
reductions".158 Therefore it would be redundant to analyse "a possible future federal regulation to 
determine whether such an 'equitable distribution' has been achieved".159 The claimants are not 
seeking to "tell Canada how to comply with the KPIA".160 The claimants are seeking "a remedy well 
within the legitimate competence" of the Federal Court.161 In particular to issue a declaration that ss 
5 and 7–8 have not been implemented.162  
It is asserted that a remedies focus would not lead to such glaring errors in judicial reasoning. This 
is because the Baker test provides a framework. Despite its capacity to be interpreted broadly, it has 
certain key strands that cannot be avoided. These act as a check against the judiciary merely using 
justiciability as a pretence to avoid awkward cases. Whereas a broad test may embolden judges to 
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miss what is actually before the court and pontificate in the ether. This is not to say that judicial 
restraint is not needed, merely that there needs to be a principled approach to judicial restraint that 
can be tracked. Although a more tightly framed approach to justiciability can reduce flexibility, it is 
a trade-off that should be taken to ward off both undue judicial reticence and undue judicial activism. 
No matter where a person sits on the political divide, both judicial activism and judicial reticence are 
problematic. However, a less theorised approach as seen in Canada encourages both judicial activism 
and judicial reticence. Yet, what is needed in facing the complexities of climate change is a middle 
path that is based on the pillars of a robust framework.  
2 Mirroring the prudential strand of the United States political questions 
doctrine 
The current prevailing Canadian judicial approach on the justiciability of climate change mirrors 
the prudential strand of the political questions doctrine of the United States. This is seen in how issues 
are framed in cases such as Friends of the Earth and Turp. Consequently, even though Canada is often 
lauded for not having a United States style political questions doctrine, which some view as an 
intellectual straight jacket,163 the practical effect is the same. The difference is that the Canadian 
equivalent of the political questions doctrine does not have the order in terms of its legal reasoning 
that the United States has and by default it mirrors the prudential strand.  
In Friends of the Earth, the Court in affirming the approaches in Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia 
(Minister of Education) and Canadian Union Public Employees v Canada (Minister of Health) found 
that:164 
Generally a court will not involve itself in the review of the actions or decisions of the executive or 
legislative branches where the subject matter of the dispute is either inappropriate for judicial involvement 
or where the court lacks the capacity to properly resolved it … 
The problem with this approach is that in focusing on prudential concerns, the Court is merely 
outlining the prudential concern in the justiciability test without actually creating a framework through 
which the prudential concern can be navigated. The Court states that the test for justiciability involves 
notions of inappropriateness for judicial involvement or notions of lack of "institutional capacity".165 
Yet, the test does not create a framework to determine this like the Baker test. This means judges have 
more discretion and fewer checks and balances than is present with a Baker-like test. A broad notion 
of institutional capacity could encompass many value-laden factors, which is unlikely to lead to a 
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principled, reasoned approach. The Court in Friends of the Earth goes on to cite Lorne Sossin's book, 
Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada, to support their reasoning.166 
Lorne Sossin argues: "Appropriateness not only includes both normative and positive elements, but 
also reflects an appreciation for both the capacities and legitimacy of judicial decision-making".167 
Although this kind of approach gives a general idea of what might be in the legal approach, it 
nevertheless creates uncertainty. Prudential concerns are better characterised as a normative inquiry, 
involving greater subjectivity and imprecise legal markers than a constitutionally interpretative 
approach. This is not to say that subjectivity is inherently bad, but subjectivity needs to be balanced 
with some degree of objectivity to achieve a principled approach.  
In Turp the Court affirmed the approach in Friends of the Earth and noted that the Federal Court 
of Appeal had upheld this decision.168 The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was 
dismissed.169 The Court in Turp did not fashion its own approach to justiciability, but merely affirmed 
the Friends of the Earth approach to supplement its conclusion that "[i]n the absence of a Charter 
challenge, it appears that a decision made in the exercise of prerogative powers would not be 
justiciable."170 
3   Focus on statutory interpretation  
One of the pillars of the broadly framed Canadian approach to justiciability is the emphasis on 
statutory interpretation, with particular recourse to United Kingdom case law. This is particularly seen 
in cases such as Friends of the Earth and Turp v Canada. This is unlike American cases such as Comer 
v Murphy and AEP, which focus on constitutional interpretation in terms of the ratio. This approach 
is tied to the broader notion of parliamentary sovereignty. It is distinct from the doctrinaire American 
constitutional interpretation focus. It involves consideration of broad issues of parliamentary intent 
and legislative framework, which often gives mixed signals about the legislative intent. The Court in 
Friends of the Earth exemplifies this approach when it outlines that:171 
The justiciability of all of these issues is a matter of statutory interpretation directed at identifying 
Parliamentary intent: in particular, whether Parliament intended that the statutory duties imposed upon the 
Minister and upon the GIC by the KPIA be subjected to judicial scrutiny and remediation. 
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The Court in Friends of the Earth puts this impetus on statutory interpretation into practice in 
terms of its focus on language. The Court asserts that the language of the relevant provisions of the 
KPIA is "clearly not mandatory". 172  The Court supports this assertion based on the so-called 
inconsistency between the obligation created by s 7(1) (based on "an isolated and strictly literal 
interpretation") and the language of s 7(2) and s 6 of the KPIA.173 Section 7(1), based on a literal 
interpretation, is said to create a duty upon the GIC "to make all of the regulatory changes required to 
ensure Kyoto compliance within 180 days of the Act coming into force".174 Conversely, the wording 
of s 7(2) "allows the GIC at any time after the passage of the Act to make further regulatory changes 
to also 'ensure' that Canada meets its Kyoto obligations".175 Equally s 6 of the KPIA states that "only 
that the GIC 'may' make regulations".176 Overall the Court in Friends of the Earth concludes that the 
180-day timeframe for Kyoto compliance is "merely directory or suggestive".177 However such a 
focus on statutory interpretation is a distraction from the main issues and leads to overblown 
conclusions. The Court is using highly academic and strained reasoning to gloss over more overtly 
political and ideological reasons to circumvent justiciability in this case.  
Equally, the Court notes:178 
This, I think, was the basis for the admonition by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department … to the effect that without clear statutory language the courts have no role to play 
to in requiring legislation to be implemented. This, he said, would tread dangerously close to the area over 
which Parliament enjoys exclusive jurisdiction. The language of subsections 7(1) and 7(2) is sufficiently 
unclear that I do not think that it was intended to override the clearly permissive meaning of the words 
"may make regulations" in subsection 6(1) of the Act. 
This verbatim from the Court illustrates how the focus on a statutory interpretation-based 
approach to justiciability means that it is a broadly framed approach with associated risks in terms of 
consistency of legal reasoning. In particular, the Federal Court here is likely to incorrectly interpret 
Parliament's intent when it looks at the language of this statute. There are both literal and purposive 
approaches to statutory interpretation. Given that the Court acknowledges that literal interpretation is 
not preferable, then presumably the Court is taking a purposive approach. If so, the Court is tasked 
with ascertaining the legislative intent from the purpose and text of the statute. If the purpose of the 
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KPIA was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it would follow that this will have an impact on the 
analysis. Though the wording may in some cases indicate legislative intent, it could be equally likely 
that the legislature did not pay a great deal of attention to the wording or assumed that its broad 
legislative intent would be presumed by the courts. This focus on language, along with a broadly 
framed conception of justiciability, creates an environment in which judges can simply seek to avoid 
politically awkward cases relating to climate change, while still appearing principled to some extent 
by purporting to be doing statutory interpretation. The practical effect is a strained interpretation of 
the statute. Even if the court points to notions of parliamentary sovereignty to justify its approach, one 
should ask why the courts are reading down provisions of the KPIA if Parliament is sovereign. The 
mixing of justiciability and parliamentary sovereignty makes for an incoherence of legal principle and 
creates conflict between the different trajectories of equally important constitutional concepts. 
Admittedly the Court goes on to acknowledge that:179 
While the courts fulfil an obvious role in the interpretation and enforcement of statutory obligations, 
Parliament can, within the limits of the constitution, reserve to itself the sole enforcement role.  
If the legislature did intend a binding obligation under s 5 of the KPIA then "a simple and 
unequivocal statement of such an intent would not have been difficult to draft".180 Some would argue 
that this kind of approach to statutory interpretation is necessary. This article asserts that it is not 
necessarily so. Justiciability by its nature in Canada and other jurisdictions is a concept developed 
vis-à-vis the common law. Although it does interact with statutory law, it can operate independently. 
Therefore, the focus on statutory interpretation is not sincere and that it is likely to encompass fears 
about the political consequences. Some scholars have argued that the reticence of this Court in 
applying the KPIA is tied to the fact that the KPIA was passed via a private member's Bill.181 This 
article asserts that even if a statute comes about through a private member's Bill, it still represents the 
will of Parliament and therefore courts should not be reading down provisions. It is important to 
acknowledge, though, that it is difficult to be definitive about the true reasons behind the judicial 
reasoning. It is noteworthy to mention that the Court in Turp was influenced by this kind of focus on 
statutory interpretation in Friends of the Earth.182 The Court in Turp held that:183 
As for determining whether this decision complies with the KPIA, to reiterate the words of Justice Barnes 
in Friends of the Earth … at para 42, if Parliament had intended to impose a justiciable duty upon the 
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government to comply with Canada's Kyoto commitments, it could easily have said so in clear and simple 
language. It did not do so.  
The Court in Turp found that not only did the Parliament not heed this salutation, nor did any of 
the provisions of the KPIA expressly or impliedly change the royal prerogative.184 This meant that 
the claimant's challenge could not succeed as Canada's "decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol 
did not violate the KPIA nor the principle of the rule of law".185 
In sum, the Canadian focus on statutory interpretation in framing a position on the justiciability 
of climate change leads to legal reasoning that is not consistent with a principled approach. This is 
because of the inbuilt broadly framed approach to justiciability in Canada being mixed with notions 
of parliamentary sovereignty. The errors in the reasoning are based on what the court is purporting to 
be doing, namely a purposive as opposed to a literal approach to statutory interpretation. The corollary 
of this is that if the Canadian courts are actually undertaking a bona fide purposive approach, then 
they should consider the purpose of the KPIA in its assessment of justiciability.  
VI  CONCLUSION 
This article has canvassed some key arguments about the differences between Canadian and 
American courts in terms of their approaches to the justiciability of climate change. A common theme 
between the jurisdictions has been the flow-on effect of how justiciability is initially framed. It 
impacts how courts approach the justiciability of climate change. This is not surprising given that 
climate change law is still at its inception and there is much more development of the law to follow.  
The juxtaposition of the prevailing approaches of the two nations provides a salient study in 
judicial responses to the complexities of climate change and the intermingling with existing concepts 
of tort, public and environmental law. Fragmentation and coherence at the initial stage have important 
impacts down the feedback loop of law. In regards to the United States, a clear framework in Baker, 
coupled with a focus on constitutional interpretation and remedies, provides a path for principled 
distinctions to be made. Conversely, the Canadian approach, lacking a clear structure initially, and 
subsequently mirroring a broad focus on prudential concerns and statutory interpretation, results in 
incoherence and flaws in legal reasoning. Although courts are not completely out of touch with 
environmental concerns, the justiciability doctrine has been fashioned to create an important 
constitutional balance. Nevertheless, it is important to enquire whether the legal reasoning is being 
used to avoid important issues. There is also an important nuance to be taken from this article, which 
is that flexibility within a framework is not the same as flexibility outside a clear framework. In the 
United States, the courts have built on the Baker test to fashion a position on the justiciability of 
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climate change that is both flexible and also congruent with certain parameters. Whereas the courts in 
Canada have been flexible without such congruence.   
The genius of the Baker test is that it is premised on the nuance that a case with some political 
aspects does not necessarily mean that the case will involve non-justiciable political questions. This 
impact of Baker is seen in cases such as Comer v Murphy and AEP, which carried through this nuance 
to its reasoning about climate change. The Baker test provides the framework to separate truly political 
questions from mere political cases; it shows the very close intersection between the general 
justiciability doctrine and the jurisprudence of the justiciability of climate change in the United States.  
The use of the classic strand of the political questions doctrine in climate change cases such as 
Comer v Murphy and AEP gives the American justiciability of climate change jurisprudence greater 
legal certainty and predictability. It also reduces arbitrariness by not allowing the so-called difficulty 
or novelty of an issue to become a barrier to its full adjudication. The remedies focus is another pillar 
of the effectiveness of the justiciability of climate change jurisprudence in America. The remedies 
focus allows courts a fair way of distinguishing between cases that impinge on the separation of 
powers and ones that do not. It also accords with notions of judicial manageability of matters as some 
matters involve standards that have been identified in previous case law. 
Equally, in Canada, when general justiciability doctrine is broadly framed, as in key cases such 
as Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC) and Reference Re Succession of Quebec, this allows 
the courts to create a very broadly framed approach to the justiciability of climate change as seen in 
the open-ended approach of the Canadian Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth. This open-ended 
approach allows judges to make arbitrary decisions on climate change matters that forgoes the need 
to give principled reasons. Yet, strong reasoning is the bedrock of a strong jurisprudence.  
The Canadian climate change jurisprudence on the justiciability of climate change as exemplified 
by Friends of the Earth in effect mirrors the prudential strand of the United States political questions 
doctrine. However, unlike the United States, which incorporates both the prudential and classic 
strands, the Canadian equivalent is both incomplete and unbalanced. This lack of balance is not 
without consequence. It accords greater power to judges which goes against the fairmindedness 
envisaged by constitutional principles such as the separation of powers. It is argued that justiciability 
doctrine should exist in its own right and not be governed by the parameters of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. In Canadian cases such as Friends of the Earth and Turp, the courts 
effectively put the onus on Parliament to determine justiciability. However, this is an odd approach. 
The KPIA has been passed by the Canadian Parliament. It had set some duties and deadlines with 
respect to climate change. Once these duties are not met, there should be a prima facie case for 
justiciability. Otherwise the Canadian courts could be perceived as using very strained legal reasoning 
to defend a hidden ideological position.  
340 (2018) 49 VUWLR 
In effect, the open-ended approach of the Canadian justiciability of climate change will have 
negative consequences for addressing the collective problem of climate change as opposed to the 
open-textured approach in the United States. 
 
